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ABSTRACT. The authors, one an ethicist and the 
other an economist, look at the issue of free trade 
with Mexico and other low wage rate countries from 
the viewpoints of their disciplines. The conclusion 
of the paper is that these disciplines differ on 
their priorities and analytical methods, not on their 
objectives. 
Ethics  vs. e c o n o m i c s :  the issue o f  free 
trade w i t h  M e x i c o  
Free trade with Mexico has recently become the 
subject of  an important,  and emotional, public 
policy debate in the United States. The issue is 
not  so much  the duty-free exchange o f  goods 
and services between the two countries, given 
the comparative advantages of  each. The issue is 
the nature o f  the comparative advantage in 
Mexico: the existence o f  very low wage rates 
which leads to the transfer o f  manufacturing 
operations and jobs from the Uni ted  States to 
Mexico. 
Very low wage rates are an economic reality 
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in all o f  the non-industrialized countries o f  
Central and South America. Indeed, it must be 
understood that Mexico is used in the current 
debate as a symbol of  a potentially much wider 
concern: the transfer of  manufacturing operations 
and jobs from the United States to low wage rate 
areas throughout the Western Hemisphere. This 
transfer obviously creates economic hardships 
within the affected communities in the United 
States, and equally obviously produces economic 
benefits in the regions of  the 3rd World coun- 
tries where the factories are built. 
The question is whether this transfer o f  U.S. 
manufacturing operations, which creates hard- 
ships in one area and benefits in another, is 
"right" and "just" and "fair". Two academic 
disciplines deal with questions expressed in those 
moral terms of  rightness, justice, and fairness: 
normative philosophy though the principles of  
ethical analysis and neoclassical economics 
through the concepts o f  welfare equilibrium. 
One  o f  us is an ethicist and the other an 
economist.  We intend in this article, to apply 
those principles and those concepts generally to 
the debate over free trade with Central and South 
America, but more specifically to the arguments 
about the benefits and harms of  the Mexican 
maquitadoras. The  Mexican maquiladoras pre- 
sently exist. Their  operations have been studied. 
Their  positive and negative outcomes are known 
and can be cited, unlike the much hazier poten- 
tial impacts of  future free trade agreements with 
other low wage rate countries. 
The Mexican maquiladoras 
Maquiladoras are manufacturing plants located in 
Journal of Business Ethics 14: 287-298, 1995. 
© 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
288 L. T. Hosmer and S. E. Masten 
Mexico that process goods and services destined 
for the U.S. market. The goods tend to be high 
volume industrial components  and consumer 
goods that require minimal job skills such as auto 
parts, textile items, and electronic units. The 
services tend to be high volume information 
processing tasks that also require minimal job 
skills, primarily in data entry. Most of  the 
maquiladoras are owned by U.S. firms. They have 
been located in Mexico to take advantage of  the 
low wage rates that are prevalent in that country. 
The wage rates in Mexico are low in com- 
parison to the United States, and that difference 
is particularly noticeable in the maquiladora 
plants which usually are located in areas with a 
large labor supply but a limited worker demand. 
In 1990, the last year for which comparative data 
are available, the average wage paid to manufac- 
turing employees in the United States was $10.84 
per hour. In Mexico the equivalent figure was 
$1.55,1 while in the maquiladoras it was just two 
thirds o f  that amount, at $0.99. 2 In some of  the 
maquiladoras located in southcentral Mexico 
wages as low as $0.63 have been reported. 3 
Allegedly as a result o f  the wage rates, which 
are obviously low by Mexican standards, the 
maquiladora workforce is not representative of  
the population. 80% of  the workers in the 
maquiladora factories are women,  and another 
10% are children between the ages of  12 and 16. 4 
The term "maquiladora" originally referred to 
the toll a flour mill would charge for grinding 
the grain that belonged to farmers and land 
owners. The new industrial plants in Mexico 
operate on much the same basis. They do not 
own the products they produce. Instead, they 
receive under bond the sheet metal for auto parts 
or the cotton and synthetic fibers for textile items 
or the electronic components for television sets 
and recording units from their parent firms in the 
U.S. They process the auto parts and textile items 
or assemble the television sets and recording 
units, and then ship back the completed 
products. Import duties back to the U.S. for the 
completed products are charged only on the 
value added by the low wage rate labor, and 
consequently do little to raise the overall costs 
of  the goods. With the advent of  free trade, of  
course, both the need for the export bonds and 
the payment of  the import  duties by the U.S. 
firms will be eliminated. 
The maquiladora industry has expanded 
rapidly since its formation in 1970. The concept 
allegedly started as an agreement between the 
two countries to provide more factory jobs in 
Mexico and thus lessen the illegal immigration 
into the United States. By 1990 there were 1886 
maquiladora plants operating in Mexico, and they 
employed more than 500 000 workers. Originally 
most of  these plants had been built along the 
border to reduce freight costs, but by 1990 they 
had expanded far into the interior. It is estimated 
that the number of  maquiladora plants and their 
workers will easily double over the next five 
years, and triple if the free trade agreement with 
Mexico becomes a reality. 5 
Benefits of the maquiladoras 
As an ethicist and as an economist we agree 
generally on the benefits that accrue to both 
Mexico and the United States as a result o f  the 
present maquiladora program and the proposed 
free trade agreement. We may disagree on the 
exact size and relative timing of  those benefits, 
but we do agree that they exist: 
Mexican employment. The first benefit is also the 
most obvious one and doubtless the most critical 
one for the Mexican economy. Maquiladoras 
provide 500,000 jobs in a country that histori- 
cally has suffered from very low industrialization 
and very high unemployment .  17% of  all the 
manufacturing jobs in Mexico are now said to 
be at American owned maquiladora plants. 6 The 
wage rates are admittedly low, even by Mexican 
standards, but the work requires only rudimen- 
tary job skills and most plants - except for those 
in the poverty-stricken south central portion of  
the country - pay about 20% higher than the 
Mexican min imum wage. 
Mexican development. The maquiladora plants 
perform for the most part very low level fabri- 
cation and assembly operations, but they perform 
them using mass manufacturing technologies 
under strict controls for both quality and cost. 
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Exposure to those technologies, and experience 
with those controls, is certainly an important step 
in the development of the Mexican economy. In 
addition, some of the employees are being trained 
as maintenance personnel and others for low level 
supervision which, again, is a necessary first step 
for further industrialization. 
American competitiveness. The maquiladoras pro- 
vide low cost manufacturing capabilities to 
American firms, and thereby help to counter the 
current Japanese move to combine their capital, 
technology, and skilled assembly at home with 
low cost component manufacturing throughout 
southeastern Asia. European firms, particularly in 
Germany, will soon have access to the low cost 
component manufacturing capabilities of Eastern 
Europe. It is certainly possible to argue that 
without equivalent access to low skilled and low 
cost labor in Mexico, the global competitiveness 
of  North  American firms will eventually be 
distinctly diminished. 
American markets. Lastly, the maquiladora plants 
provide paying jobs and raise living standards in 
Mexico, a nation of ninety million consumers 
who eventually should come to demand U.S. 
exports in both products and services. The 
annual per capita income in Mexico, which now 
stancls at only $2250, is admittedly much too low 
to support active import markets in automobiles, 
appliances and other "big ticket" items, but again 
it is certainly possible to argue that the increased 
Mexican prosperity will eventually lead to 
expanded American exports of  consumer goods, 
industrial equipment, and financial services. 
Harms of the maquiladoras 
As an ethicist and as an economist we also agree 
generally on the harms that have come to both 
Mexico and the United States as a result of the 
present maquiladora program and the future free 
trade agreement. We may disagree on the exact 
size and personal impact of those harms, but we 
do agree that they exist: 
American unemployment. Each new job created 
in Mexico by an American-owned maquiladora 
plant results in the loss of  the equivalent job in 
the United States. That job might have been 
lost regardless of  the Mexican transfer by a lack 
of  American competitiveness, and it may be 
replaced in the near future by an expansion of 
the Mexican market for imported goods and 
services, but the unemployment in North 
America does create a hardship for the individual 
workers and the affected communities. 
Unsafe working conditions. The American owners 
of  the maquiladora factories are, of course, not 
required to meet U.S. standards for workplace 
safety. The are required to meet Mexican stan- 
dards, but those rules and regulations are 
much less stringent and they tend to be poorly 
enforced. Few maquiladora plants are open to 
inspection by independent researchers, and con- 
sequently the degree of  workplace safety cannot 
be verified. It has to be assumed that most of  
the plants meet reasonable safety standards, but 
it also has to be admitted that numerous reports 
have criticized the textile factories for "chronic 
asthma, conjunctivitis, bronchitis and brown lung 
as common occupational diseases" caused by 
cotton dust and air-borne fibers, and the pro- 
tection of  workers in some electronic, firm 
processing, and woodworking maquiladoras 
against toxic chemicals and hazardous materials 
is said to be "extremely poor" ]  
Unhealthful environmental discharges. As with 
worker safety, the American owners of  the 
maquiladora factories are not required to meet 
U.S. standards for the protection of  the environ- 
ment. Once again, few maquiladora plants are 
open to inspection by independent researchers, 
but solid waste dumps and liquid waste discharges 
can be observed from outside the property line. 
Numerous environmentalists have criticized the 
maquiladoras on the grounds that they have 
severely polluted the border regions. High levels 
of copper, selenium, mercury, and various 
hydrocarbons have been found in the rivers, 
while large dumps of  plastic, metal, rubber, paint, 
resin, and packing materials waste are found on 
land near the new industrial parks. Under a 
binational agreement, the maquiladoras are 
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required to ship hazardous chemicals back to the 
Uni ted States for proper treatment and disposal 
following notification o f  the EPA. But, the 
proper t reatment  and disposal o f  hazardous 
chemical waste is very expensive, and this bina- 
tional agreement seems to be widely ignored. In 
1989 the EPA reported just 12 notifications o f  
the required shipments back to the Uni ted  
States. 8 
The  question we want to address is whether  
this mixture o f  benefits and harms is "right" and 
'`just" and "fair" Should public policies within 
the Uni ted  States and Mexico encourage or 
discourage or attempt to ameliorate the impacts 
o f  further use by American firms o f  the low cost 
labor in the Mexican maquiladoras? It this 
practice beneficial or harmful to the welfare o f  
the two societies? We will start with the view of  
the ethicist. 
Basic position of the ethicist 
The issue is not whether  the benefits o f  this 
action - the transfer o f  manufacturing operations 
from the Uni ted  States to Mexico - outweigh 
the harms. That would be simple Utilitarianism 
(Mill) :9 always select the action with the greatest 
net social benefit. Utilitarianism is the principle 
that is so often roughly translated as "the greatest 
good for the greatest number"  
There  are two problems with the "greatest 
good"  principle. Both are well known and 
generally accepted. The first is that it is difficult 
to measure many o f  the non-economic  benefits 
an harms. How do we measure the harms to the 
Mexican workers through the toxic working 
conditions, for example, w h e n  we know that 
many industrial health problems do not surface 
for years after the initial exposure? How do we 
measure the harms to the Mexican environment 
through the proliferation o f  solid waste dumps, 
as another example, with their constant threats 
to the ground water supplies in that arid country? 
Unfortunately, the normal tendency is to simply 
ignore those hard-to-measure harms, particularly 
if  they are in another count ry  far from our 
purview and concern. 
The second problem with Utilitarianism is that 
the distribution o f  the benefits and harms is also 
ignored; only that net social balance is felt to be 
important. Obviously, that is inappropriate. If  we 
could show substantial benefits for the American 
companies, and substantial though somewhat 
smaller harms for the Mexican workers and 
residents, for example, few people would then 
argue that the resulting balance was "right" and 
"just" and "fair." Most would simply agree that 
this was another  example o f  economic  colo- 
nialism. 
Distribution does matter. Distribution is also 
the topic o f  one o f  the most compelling o f  the 
ethical principles: Distributive Justice (Rawls). l° 
The basic concept is that the members o f  society 
who cooperate for the production o f  social goods 
are not indifferent to the distribution o f  those 
goods; they would obviously prefer to have more 
rather than less. Numerous  alternative methods 
have been devised to govern that distribution: 
to each person according to his or her ability, 
effort, position, need, or existence. Our  present 
society makes use o f  all five methods, but all are 
to some extent unjust because all, again to some 
extent, disregard the legitimate claims o f  others. 
According to the proponent  o f  the principle 
of  Distributive Justice, the one agreement that 
people would make if they were ignorant of  their 
future ability, energy, position, or need relative 
to others would be that the least among us - 
those with the least ability, energy, or position 
or those with the most need - should not  be 
harmed but instead should be included in the 
distribution. The  amount  o f  that distribution is 
not specified; instead the rule is that this group 
should receive some o f  the benefits from every 
action. This, it is felt by most ethicists, has to be 
the most "just" proposal for the distribution of  
social goods because it has to be the most disin- 
terested: people at the time they made this social 
contract would not  know whether  they would 
benefit or suffer from the agreement because they 
would be ignorant o f  their relative position. 
Now we come to the issue of  the maquiladoras 
and the transfer o f  manufactur ing operations. 
Who  suffers? The least amongst us: those with 
least income, least education, least influence, least 
ability to look after their own self-interests, on 
both sides o f  the border. Unskilled workers in 
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the United States lose their jobs. Unskilled 
workers in Mexico are hired in their place, but 
at wages that are not attractive in any market 
sense or the workforce would not be so over- 
whetmingly young and female. The Mexican 
workers bear the brunt of  the unsafe working 
conditions and the harmful environmental dis- 
charges, as well. Clearly the present operations 
of  the maquiladora factories are "unjust." They 
do not meet the tenets of  Distributive Justice. 
Basic position of the economist 
The axiom of  Distributive Justice described 
above is an improbable ethical precept. First, 
measurement difficulties plague theories of  
Distributive Justice exactly as they do Utilitar- 
ianism. By what measure do we determine who 
is least amongst us? If based on ability, energy, 
position or need, how do we assess these 
characteristics and how do we choose among or 
weight these criteria? It a person with a slow 
metabolism and $10 000 better or worse off than 
an energetic person with $5000? Do mental, 
physical, or financial capabilities have a greater 
influence on well being? Measurement issues 
pervade all theories of  ethical behavior con- 
cerned with the impact of  actions on the welfare 
of  individuals. 
A more important criticism of  the rule that 
each action not harm the least amongst us, 
however, is that individuals behind the Veil of  
Ignorance are unlikely to choose a society that 
required the least amongst them to benefit from 
"every action" Consider, for example, a series of  
actions, the end result of  which was an enormous 
improvement in the lot of  the poorest individ- 
uals but some proper subset of  which would 
result in small and transitory losses to those 
individuals. To say that individuals behind the 
Veil of  Ignorance would rule out such actions is 
to say that individuals would never save today to 
increase their consumption tomorrow because 
saving and investment necessarily reduce well- 
being today. 
More general, most people (all but those that 
are infinitely averse to risk) would be willing to 
give up some degree of equality in outcomes in 
order to gain a measure of progress. It is hard to 
imagine preferences under which individuals 
(again, unaware of their prospective position in 
society) would favor a society that impoverishes 
the bulk of its members in the name of  equity 
over a society that tolerates some inequality of  
wealth but provides a respectable standard of  
living for the vast majority of its citizens. One 
could claim that such a tradeoff between equity 
and wealth does not exist. Unfortunately, the 
evidence does not support that assertion. 
But even if such a strong form of  the principle 
of  Distributive Justice were accepted, the 
maquiladora system would withstand ethical 
scrutiny. Since the economic and social status of 
Mexicans employed by the maquiladoras in 
obviously so much lower than their counterparts 
in the U.S., there are only two ways maquiladora 
operations can be held to violate the ethical 
imperative not to harm the least amongst us. The 
first is to define "amongst us" so narrowly as to 
exclude Mexican workers, a position so patently 
chauvinistic it demands no further comment. 
The other is to argue that the existence of  
maquiladoras somehow actually makes Mexicans 
worse off. 
The employees of the maquiladoras certainly 
do not perceive themselves as worse off, as evi- 
denced by the large number of  Mexicans 
attracted to these jobs. The immediate benefit is 
gainful employment for a young and unskilled 
work force. Employment in the maquiladoras, 
moreover, provides workers with experience and 
cultivates basic work skills essential for their 
future advancement. Clearly, then, the maqui- 
ladoras improve the tot of  their Mexican 
employees and thus satisfy even the overly 
restrictive standard associated with the notion of  
Distributive Justice you describe. 
First response of the ethicist 
Obviously measurement problems are present in 
Distributive Justice, but the measurements here 
do not need to be as precise as in the conse- 
quential theories. All we need do is identify the 
least amongst us, and we can readily do that in 
ways that are satisfactory to an ethicist if not to 
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an economist. They  are the people with the least 
money,  the least education, the least ability to 
influence the decisions and actions that affect 
themselves, and we can find them on both sides 
o f  most national borders. The  U.S. workers who  
have been left without  jobs may or may not be 
worse off  than the Mexican workers who appear 
to be underpaid. That is not the issue. The issue 
is that we should not harm either group, and yet 
that is precisely what is happening. 
Before going on to discuss those harms, and 
their lack o f  remedy through the imperfect labor 
markets, let me stress that Distributive Justice 
does not  mean that the participants in the Social 
Contract  are unable somehow to compute  the 
net  present value o f  a series o f  actions, or  to 
recognize the income stream associated with 
savings and investments and delayed consump- 
tion. Further, the principle does not  mean that 
everyone must have equal income or similar 
wealth or equivalent education. It does mean, 
however, that those with income and wealth and 
education should not  harm those without .  A 
simple and, to my mind, decent  ethical pre- 
scription. 
I f  you are going to avoid that simple and 
decent  ethical prescription, then you will have to 
claim that the U.S. workers who are left wi thout  
jobs they may have held for years have not been 
harmed,  and that the Mexican workers who are 
so poorly paid that the maquiladora workforce 
is admittedly skewed towards the young and the 
female, also have not been harmed. In short, you 
will have to appeal to the supposed impartiality 
o f  the labor markets in both countries. 
If  the labor force in the affected communities 
in the U.S. was truly mobile - that is, i f  the 
displaced workers could easily move geographi- 
cally to a different communi ty  or technically to 
a different industry - and if the national economy 
in the Uni ted States was adequately prosperous 
- that is, if  the displaced workers could quickly 
find a range o f  different opportunities from 
which to choose - then we could safely disre- 
gard the harms to those people. But, those con- 
ditions - which  are essential assumptions of  
economic theory - are seldom if ever met. 
T h e  same conditions - the lack o f  a labor 
market  that is truly mobile and a national 
economy that is truly prosperous - exist with 
even greater force in the rural sections of  Mexico 
where  the maquiladora factories are located. The 
problems are compounded  there because the 
bargaining power relationship between the single 
dominant  employer and the numerous potential 
employees is so obviously unequal. We can see 
the results: low wages, long hours, poor condi- 
tions. Labor markets require an equivalency o f  
position, an ability to say " n o "  W h e n  that ability 
to say "no"  is removed, the supposed connection 
between the market for labor and the welfare o f  
society is also removed. 
The  critical importance o f  the abihty to say 
"no"  is derived from another  ethical principle: 
Contributive Liberty (Nozick). ll The  central 
concept  here is that liberty is more  important  
than justice, and that consequently the one 
agreement  that people would make who were 
ignorant o f  their future ability, energy, or position 
would be that no one should ever interfere with 
the rights o f  others for self-development and 
self-fulfillment. We don't have to guarantee the 
rights o f  others to develop to the fullest of  their 
abilities; we just don' t  want to interfere with 
those rights. Yet, that is precisely what  is hap- 
pening. 
Workers in both the Uni ted States and Mexico 
have clearly been denied the rights to self- 
development and self-fulfillment through the lack 
o f  mobile and efficient markets for their labor. 
The  workers in Mexico are further denied those 
rights to self-development and self-fulfillment 
through the imposition o f  harms to their health 
in the poor working conditions and the severe 
environmental  damages. I do hope that you at 
least briefly ment ion  the working conditions and 
environmental damages in your next statement. 
First response of the economist 
I do not want to belabor the measurement issue 
but, suffice it to say, the requirements o f  Dis- 
tributive Justice are no less in measurement  
respects than those of  economic theories and thus 
do not provide dispositive grounds to favor the 
former over the latter. 12 O n  the conceptual level, 
meanwhile,  I am pleased to see that you have 
Ethics, Economics, and Free Trade with Mexico 293 
made a major concession regarding the applica- 
tion o f  the "least-amongst-us" rule. Specifically, 
your acknowledgement o f  the appropriateness o f  
assessing "the net present value o f  a series o f  
actions" admits (i) the possibility o f  conflicts 
between short-run and long-run effects o f  
actions, and (ii) that individual actions cannot 
be evaluated in isolation from the broader 
complex of  social and economic interactions. 
This is important because the existence of  
tradeoffs between immediate and ultimate con- 
sequences of  particular ethical rules implies the 
need to assess and compare the harms with the 
benefits, that is, to make cost-benefit analyses. 
Consider some o f  the implications o f  
Distributive Justice as you define it. All progress, 
every advance in history, has involved disloca- 
tions. The advent o f  air travel displaced workers 
in the railroad industry, the development o f  
which had previously displaced barge labor. Mass 
product ion of  automobiles had similar conse- 
quences for blacksmiths. If new research revealed 
the potential for an unlimited source of  safe and 
inexpensive energy, would it be unethical to 
develop the technology because coal miners 
and oil and gas field hands would lose their 
livelihoods? Under  such a rule, it would be an 
unethical God that sent manna from heaven, 
thereby destroying the livelihood of  farmers. 
Strict application would also enjoin m i n imum 
wages, each 10% increase in which reduces 
employment  o f  teenagers and young adults (the 
1east skilled and lowest paid) by t% to 2%, as welt 
as many occupational and environmental regula- 
tions that also displace workers and inhibit new 
job creation. Ironically, whereas each action 
described above would fail a strict interpretation 
of  the least-amongst-us rule, a social welfare 
criterion requires only a showing of  sufficient net 
benefits. 
The maquiladoras raise precisely the same 
issues. The world is imperfect, and progress in 
this as in any other area inevitably causes dislo- 
cations. The  question is whether  overall the 
world will be a better place if we permit  the free 
flow of  resources across international borders or 
prohibit it. Ask the Mexican workers whether  
they consider themselves better off with or 
wi thout  the maquiladoras. Unsuccessful and 
obviously frustrated union organizers have com- 
plained o f  maquiladoras, "Unfortunately, their 
workers are very happy"]  3 I have already cited 
the basic skills and work experience these 
workers receive, which must ultimately enhance 
their employability and self-worth. The best way 
to expand those opportunities and to enhance the 
economic position of  Mexican workers is to 
foster, not inhibit, investment in new businesses 
south of  the border. 
Regarding work and environmental condi- 
tions, it is true that Mexican laws are more 
lenient toward work-place hazards and pollution 
than our own. One needs to recognize, however, 
that, like food, running water, refrigeration, and 
medical care, a more pleasant -work environment 
is costly. While each i tem on this list contributes 
to a better quality o f  life, given finite resources, 
the cost o f  an additional peso spent improving 
the environment is one less peso available for 
food, housing, rudimentary medical care, and 
other basics. More stringent regulation of  busi- 
nesses also risks discouraging investment and 
slowing the development o f  the Mexican 
economy. It should not  be surprising then, in 
light of  its level o f  economic development, that 
Mexico and other countries in its position adopt 
less severe environmental standards. As incomes 
increase, both the total and relative shares o f  
resources that populations are willing to allot to 
various purposes change. We have a responsibility 
perhaps to share our knowledge about the nature 
o f  the tradeoffs involved and to foster represen- 
tative political institutions, but a policy that forces 
another society to adopt the standards that we, 
in our relative affluence, find congenial is both 
condescending and injurious to the welfare of  the 
Mexican poor. 
Last, if  not  least, is the effects of  the 
maquiladoras on Americans. The most conspic- 
uous harms are, o f  course, to dislocated workers, 
and no one should minimize the trauma losing 
one's job can cause. But we must also consider 
the effects o f  maquiladora operations on other 
Americans. Far worse off  than the average 
American factory worker are many people who 
have never benefitted from such jobs in the first 
place, who don't  have the remedial work skills 
and discipline needed to hold a steady job, who 
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are physically or mentally impaired, or who  must 
raise children wi thout  a spouse. Because restric- 
tions on  the m o v e m e n t  o f  resources inevitably 
raise prices and because poor  individuals must  
expend a m u c h  larger fraction of  their income 
on consumpt ion ,  the burden  of  such price 
increases fall disproport ionately on the poor.  
Trade restrictions, especially on  food, clothing, 
transportation, and other  basic commodit ies ,  are, 
in effect, a regressive tax. Fur thermore,  limita- 
tions on the ability o f  entrepreneurs to elimi- 
nate or transfer jobs will ineluctably discourage 
the creation of  new jobs. The  harm caused to 
individuals whose opportuni t ies  to find gainful 
employment  are circumscribed is just as real as 
that suffered by those whose jobs are displaced. 
Again, we are forced to apply cost-benefit  rea- 
soning: Would  the benefits o f  restricting trade 
to the subset o f  American workers harmed by the 
free flow o f  resources exceed the combined  costs 
to Mexican workers, American consumers,  and 
the millions o f  Amer ican  workers w h o  benefit 
from international trade. 
Surely it is a dubious ethical principle that 
would  deny to some of  the world's poorest  
people  access to Amer ican  markets and, wi th  
that, the relative prosperity that a system of  free 
markets and free enterprise has bestowed on  
Americans.  Indeed  facilitating trade amo n g  
countries is probably the single most  important  
th ing we can do to relieve economic  hardship 
and suffering th roughou t  the world.  I f  you 
disagree, perhaps you could be specific about  
what  sort o f  system you think would  lead to an 
ethically superior outcome.  
Second response of the ethicist 
Before I accept your  challenge to describe the 
"sort o f  system that would  lead to an ethically 
superior ou tcome" ,  let me take up one or two 
other issues that you have recently raised. Firstly, 
it seems obvious to me  that there is a massive 
difference be tween  employmen t  dislocations 
caused by technological advances such as those 
you cite - air travel replaced the railroads which  
in tu rn  had replaced barge traffic - and those 
caused by job  exports.  Technological  advance 
occur  slowly. Employees have time to adjust. Job 
exports occur  quickly, with  terminat ion notices 
handed out  on  Friday afternoons. Technological 
advances create new oppor tuni t ies  that are 
immediate ,  apparent,  and often are local. Job 
exports create new opportunit ies  that may occur 
at some future time, in some unrelated industry, 
in some distant community .  On e  group appar- 
ently has to "take the hit" in all major economic  
change. Wh y  does that "hi t"  always seem to be 
ignored or smoothed  over or assumed away in 
economic  theory? Wh y  does that group always 
seem to include those people wh o  have the least 
resources - both financial and psychological - for 
waiting, retraining, and mov ing  in response to 
the change? Both  responses go against simple 
concepts o f  justice. 
Let me  also say just a word or two about your  
proposal that Mexican citizens should be able to 
make their o wn  trade-offs be tween  employment  
opportunit ies,  workplace hazards, and environ- 
mental  damages. O f  course they should! We 
agree totally. But,  there have to be choices. One  
offer o f  an employment  oppor tuni ty  cont ingent  
u p o n  certain workplace hazards and environ- 
mental  harms is not  a choice. It is a ul t imatum. 
Externally imposed ult imatums go against simple 
concepts of  liberty. 
Now, we come  to the decision system that 
should lead to ethically superior  outcomes .  I 
think that I have been describing exactly that sort 
o f  system in this discussion. It has to include the 
concept  o f  justice. It has to include the concept  
o f  liberty. It has to include the concept  o f  duty. 
And,  lastly, it has to include a smat ter ing o f  
compassion. 
You don' t  like my definition o f  justice (Rawls), 
but  you suggest none  to take its place beyond 
what  I assume is a reliance upon  what  seem to 
me  to be obviously flawed factor and product  
markets, and a laudable though  hazy intent  to 
compute  the external costs imposed upon  people. 
I th ink that we as a society have to be m u c h  
more  exact than that in thinking about  such an 
impor tan t  concept  as justice. Wha t  exactly do 
you mean  by the term? Where  precisely does 
justice fit in economic  theory? 
You don ' t  like my def ini t ion of  liberty 
(Nozick) either, but  again you suggest none  to 
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take its place beyond what I assume is the same 
reliance upon flawed product and factor markets 
and the intent, again laudable but hazy, to "foster 
representative political institutions". Here also as 
a society I think that we have to be much more 
careful in thinking about such as important  
concept.  What  exactly are the rights o f  the 
workers in the Uni ted  States whose jobs have 
been transferred to Mexico? What exactly are the 
rights o f  the workers in Mexico who are forced 
to work at wages that we would not  accept in 
the Uni ted  States - even given the differences 
in the living standards - under workplace con- 
ditions and environmental damages we would not 
permit  in the United States. Where  do the rights 
o f  individuals fit in economic theory, or are they 
simply neglected and ignored? 
t have not yet provided a definition o f  duty. 
O n e  o f  the central tenets o f  normative ethics is 
that if  we have rights we also have duties. What  
do we owe to others? The answer o f  the ethicist 
is that the only duty we truly owe to others is 
that o f  consistency in our  actions, that similar 
situations should be addressed similarly regardless 
o f  momentary  changes in our self interests. This 
is the ethical principle, also very compelling in 
my view, o f  Universal duties (Kant), TM expressed 
in the two formulations o f  the Categorical 
Imperative. 
This first formulat ion o f  the Categorical 
Imperative is that we should take no action that 
we are not  willing to have become a universal 
law, incumbent  upon ourselves as well as others. 
That  is, if we subject workers in the lower skill 
positions in our society to a continual auction 
worldwide for their jobs - who is willing to do 
this task equally well but more cheaply? - then 
we have the  duty to subject workers in the higher 
skill positions - including ourselves, our friends 
and our colleagues - to an equivalent auction. 
We tend not to do that, and we cite differences 
in training requirements,  certification exams, 
tenure policies, personal relationships, and legal 
restrictions as the reasons, but according to Kant 
we have a duty to be consistent, and to under-  
stand that if  it is "r ight" in one instance it must 
be "right" in the other. 
The same argument obviously applied to issues 
o f  workplace safety and environmental pollution. 
If  we adopt one set o f  standards on those issues 
in the Uni ted  States, then we have a duty to 
extend those same standards to our  operations 
in Mexico. It does not  matter that the Mexicans 
are perhaps more desperate for jobs, and willing 
to accept lower and much  more harmful 
standards; we have a duty  to treat everyone, 
regardless o f  their social or economic or polit- 
ical positions, exactly alike. 
The second formulat ion o f  the Categorical 
Imperative is derived from the first formulation; 
it states that we should treat others as ends in 
themselves, wor thy o f  dignity and respect, not  
as means to our  ends. The  managers o f  the 
companies that own the maquiladora factories 
obviously treat the displaced workers in the 
Uni ted States and the underpaid workers in 
Mexico as means to corporate goats,and clearly 
violate that rule. 
The second formulat ion o f  the Categorical 
Imperative is compassion; it is also expressed in 
all o f  the world's major religions. It is not as exact 
as the other three principles - do not harm the 
least amongst us; do not  interfere with an 
individual's right to self-development; and do not 
take any action that you are unwilling to have 
become a universal duty, applicable to all - but 
it is still important. The lack o f  precision is the 
reason I said I wanted a "smattering" o f  com- 
passion in the system. That te rm wilt give you 
all sorts o f  opportunities to complain about the 
imprecision o f  measurements in ethics. 
In short, to answer your question, I want an 
economic system for the production o f  goods and 
services in which there is an explicit definition 
o f  justice, o f  rights, and o f  duties, together with 
a general acceptance or recognition or "smat- 
tering" o f  compassion. Economic  theory in its 
present state neglects all four o f  those critically 
important  concepts. Consequently I think that 
it is the wrong theoretical structure to use when  
evaluating major public policy changes such as 
the proposed free trade agreement with tow wage 
countries in Central and South America that will 
cause such obvious harms to so many members 
o f  society in all o f  the countries. 
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S e c o n d  response o f  the e c o n o m i s t  
I do not  know where you got the idea that econ-  
omists ignore the harms caused by economic  
change. After reviewing what  I have wr i t ten  
above, I am certain that I have said no th ing  to 
warrant that opinion. O n  the contrary, my entire 
focus has been on the best way to improve the 
lot of  the least advantaged in society. There  is, 
moreover,  an extensive literature in economics 
on justice, duties, rights, and even altruism. The  
idealized not ion  o f  product  and factor markets 
you disparage represents a convenient  straw man 
but an inaccurate characterization o f  the state o f  
economic  analysis. 
T h e  more  important  message, however, is that 
unders tanding economics  is a prerequisite to 
developing sound ethical prescriptions. Employ-  
ing rudimentary  economic  principles, I have 
sought  to establish two points: first, that your  
"explicit  def ini t ion" of  justice, strictly inter-  
preted, implies behavior that is incompatible with 
ethical intuitions, and second, that any ethical 
rule that does con fo rm to widely held ethical 
intuitions must be congruent  with  cost-benefit  
reasoning. Your own  arguments belie your  
denials. Your defense, for instance, that the pace 
o f  change associated with technological innova- 
t ion differentiates it f rom other  economic  
transformations - aside from the disputable 
factual accuracy of  that claim - reveals that the 
standard you embrace is relative, not  absolute: 
Harms to the least amongst  us are in the end 
justifiable, you admit, as long as the harms are 
not  too severe or persistent and the benefits 
sufficiently large and immediate.  
I f  the validity of  ethical rules does indeed turn 
on their consequences, then we have an obliga- 
t ion to discover the consequences o f  proposed 
rules in their entirety. No t  the least among  eco- 
nomics '  contributions to moral philosophy is the 
apparatus to analyze the complex of  interactions 
among  individuals in society and to trace the 
effects o f  particular rules on  those individuals 
well being. As I indicated earlier, good  if  mis- 
placed intentions to help one set o f  individuals 
often result in other  individuals, less for tunate  
still, be ing harmed.  It does not  help the cause 
o f  justice to ignore harms caused by our  actions 
simply because their  causal relations are more  
complicated or subtle, especially if  the tools 
already exist to identify and measure those 
consequences.  Unders tand ing  economics  may 
not  be a sufficient condi t ion for deriving ethical 
principles, but  it is arguably a necessary one. 
Finally, real, sustained advancement  in the 
living standards o f  the world's poor  requires 
concrete,  pragmatic policies and institutions. 
Sure, the world would  be a better  place if  
individuals behaved ethically. If  people could be 
trusted not  to lie or cheat in their business 
dealings, enormous  resources could be saved on 
lawyers if no th ing  else. But  the desirability o f  
compell ing by force o f  law those wh o  would  not  
otherwise con fo rm their  behavior  to ethical 
norms  is a separate quest ion f rom what  the 
norms of  individual behavior should be. I, as an 
individual,  may be moved  by compassion or a 
sense o f  duty to pay my workers more  than the 
market  requires. In effect, I pay for the satisfac- 
t ion I receive from improving their situation or 
simply from behaving virtuously, and no one 
suffers from my action. (Although even virtue has 
a price! A m  I more  vir tuous distributing my 
finite wealth to my employees or to impoverished 
villagers in southern Mexico - or might  it not  
be better still to reinvest my earnings in produc-  
tive assets that create new jobs and increase, 
rather than merely redistribute, the economic  
pie?) But  laws mandat ing  "ethical" behavior  - 
requiring, for instance, that employers compen-  
sate workers at above market  rates - may actually 
have deleterious ethical implications,  as the 
documented  effects o f  m i n i m u m  wage legislation 
on the employment  o f  the lowest-skilled workers 
illustrates. Like m i n i m u m  wage laws, legal 
impediments  to trade with Mexico, however well 
in tent ioned,  cannot  br ing about real, sustained 
improvements  in the condi t ion  of  the least 
among us. 
In the end, it is not  enough  to say that you 
favor an economic  system founded  on  justice, 
liberty, and duties. You must  also explain how 
the values you espouse translate into practical 
results. Th rough  what  means do you propose to 
increase the living standards o f  the Mexican 
masses i f  not  by p romot ing  investment  in the 
Mexican economy? H o w  do you plan to insulate 
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the poor  in our  own country  from the higher 
prices that would result from prohibiting the flow 
o f  resources to lowest producers? It is no longer 
a matter o f  conjecture, one need only look at the 
world around us to see that economies based on 
property rights, free markets, and democrat ic  
political institutions do the most to enhance the 
f reedom and living standards o f  their citizens. 
Granted, there is room for improvement.  But 
every proposed adjustment will involve tradeoffs, 
gains and losses exactly like the ones we have 
been discussing here. 15 As yet, no one has devel- 
oped a better system, though assorted utopians 
have amply earned their appellation trying. 
Conclusion of the ethicist 
You have a legitimate issue in the complexity o f  
economic  interactions, and you state your  
position very well. But, I do not  agree with your 
bel ief  that " the validity o f  ethical rules turns 
upon  (the) consequences" o f  those economic  
interactions. There  are some decisions and 
actions that are simply wrong, regardless o f  their 
consequences. There are the ones that contradict 
the basic ethical principles o f  justice, o f  rights, 
and o f  duties, and the basic ethical prescription 
o f  compassion. 
It would appear that the difference between us 
is one o f  priority, not  o f  objective. I believe that 
a conceptual framework to guide public policy 
decisions and actions that stresses justice, rights, 
duties, and compassion and that assumes adequate 
output o f  material goods and services will best 
serve society. You apparently believe that a 
conceptual f ramework that stresses efficient 
product ion o f  goods and services, and that 
assumes adequate conditions o f  justice, rights, 
duties, and compassion, will best serve society. 
Given the increasing cost compet i t ion o f  the 
global economy, and the expanding importance 
o f  public decisions on  such issues as trade 
policies, living standards, working conditions, and 
environmental  Iimits, we shall soon de termine  
empirically which o f  us is correct. 
Conclusion of the economist 
Certainly, ends do not justify means. At the same 
time, however, no one would accept as a uni-  
versal ethical principle a rule that would have 
monstrous consequences. And monstrous indeed 
are the conditions many o f  the world'  poor must 
endure. Much  o f  the world's misery is beyond 
anyone's power to remedy; if  we have any ethical 
obligations at all, surely they must include taking 
steps to relieve those conditions where  some 
measure o f  relief is within our power to give. If 
you and I can agree on that, the remaining 
question is whether  free trade serves or frustrates 
that purpose. O n  that we obviously disagree. 
In the end, we cannot base public policies or 
business decisions on theories that assume either 
an adequate level o f  goods and services or an 
adequate condition o f  justice, rights, and duties. 
The  two are inextricably intertwined.  The 
sooner that not ion becomes broadly accepted, 
the sooner the norms o f  prosperity and equity 
will be advanced. 
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